In 1913, the Conference of Ambassadors (Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) signed in London the treaty for the division of the former Ottoman Empire territories, also including, despite the Greek objections, the delineation of the Greek-Albanian borders. In May 1920, Greece, which had already ceded to Albania fourteen villages in the region of Korçë, was forced to sign the settlement suggested for the delineation of its borders with Albania, under pressure from the French and Italian diplomacy.
After the war in Asia Minor in 1922, and the final abandonment of the ‘Great Idea’, Greece found itself in an extremely unfavourable situation, internationally isolated, because of its hasty decision to execute the ‘Six’, as culpable for the tragedy in Asia Minor. The signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, on 24 July 1923, raised hopes again for a new period of stability in the Balkans and everyone tried to understand the wider impact of this treaty. Throughout the interwar period, Greek foreign policy entered a new phase: irridentism and territorial integration, which had been the main aspirations of the country for a whole century, were replaced by other goals, such as maintaining the security and the country’s territorial integrity, under the new international treaties, rebuilding social structures, and ascertaining their loyalty to the allies. The successive governments were barely able to rise to the occasion.
On 7 March 1923, the internationally mandated, tri-national commission of Greece, Albania and Italy, set up to decide on the final delineation of the Greek-Albanian borders, arrived in Ioannina headed by the Italian General Tellini, but commenced its work two months later. On the morning of Monday 27 August 1923, at the Greek-Albanian border, near Kakavia, Tellini met the Greek Lieutenant Colonel Demetrios Notis Botsaris and the Secretary of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhimitër Beratti. The missions departed in separate cars, whereas the Greeks, during the journey, encountered a mechanical failure and were forced to stall. When they began again their journey to Kakavia, ten kilometres from the borders, in Zepi, they met the Italian mission, which on its way to Drino valley, had been ambushed. Enrico Tellini, his first lieutenant Mario Bonacini, surgeon Corti, interpreter Thanas Craveri from Leskovik, and the driver Farnetti Remigio had all been shot to death by unknown gunfire.
Immediate action was taken by the Greek side to investigate the case. Moreover, the Greek Government went to the Conference of the Ambassadors and the League of Nations on the same day, requesting to set up a special committee to investigate the assassination and perform interrogations within the Albanian territory, but it was confronted with accusations from the Italian government that they were responsible for this crime, for which there were no eyewitnesses, despite the investigations and the bounty on the perpetrators. The news of the assassination caused considerable political upheaval, both in Italy and in Albania, which presented the victims as fallen martyrs defending the Albanian side.
On 29 August, Mussolini’s government (which had assumed power ten months earlier) not waiting for the results of the investigation and the interrogations, sent a nota via telegram with very onerous terms, and a 24-hour deadline, through its ambassador in Athens: it demanded from the highest Greek military authority to apologise before the Italian ambassador in Athens, to pay military honours to the victims during their transport to Preveza, to hold a memorial service for the victims in the presence of the entire ministerial cabinet in the Catholic Cathedral of Athens, to pay homage to the Italian flag on the day of the memorial in Faliro Bay, to perform interrogation with the collaboration of the Italian military attaché, whose personal safety would be guaranteed by Greece, to condemn the perpetrators to death and, finally, Greece to pay 50 million Italian liras, five days after the service of the ultimatum. Of all these demands, the revolutionary government of Plastiras-Gonatas, only accepted to pay honour, to apologise, and to perform the memorial service in the presence of the ministerial cabinet. The government was also willing to aid the families of the murdered. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Apostolos Alexandris, suggested to Italy to entrust the settlement of their dispute to the League of Nations, and he sent a telegram to Mussolini assuring him that the murderers of Tellini and his escorts were not Greek but Albanian bandits. The revolutionary government reacted reassuringly and with unreasonable moderation, perhaps believing that Italy would exhaust all diplomatic and legal procedures. However, the Greek answer was considered a rejection of the Italian Government’s claims, and Mussolini ordered a squadron of his fleet, which was already docked in Taranto, to sail to Corfu.
On 30 August, a dirigible airship, of the ‘Zeppelin’ type, appeared in the Corfiot sky, without arousing any particular suspicion, since very few had been informed of the murder of Tellini. The following morning four battleships, among which the squadron flagship ‘Conte di Cavour’, five heavy and five light cruisers, three carriers and five more torpedo boats and submarines of the Italian navy arrived in Corfu. To the Corfiots’ surprise, Captain Antonio Foschini landed on the island, as a representative of Admiral Solari, who, escorted by the Italian Consul on the island, Adolfo Schelini, headed to the Prefecture and serviced an ultimatum to the Prefect, Petros Evripaios, to immediately surrender the island: “By order of the government of His Majesty the King of Italy, I shall proceed to the peaceful occupation of the island of Corfu. If there is resistance or obstruction, on your part or by any other political or military authority, I shall resort to violence. The occupation shall commence thirty minutes after the service of this ultimatum and, after the expiration of this deadline, if my envoy does not return to my ship or if all my claims are not fully accepted, I shall proceed to military action.” He also forbade all communication with Athens and left. Evripaios’ surprise and bewilderment was followed by frustration, as he did not manage to communicate with the government and with the Minister of Internal Affairs Georgios Papandreou, while he protested before the Italian authorities for the violation of the neutrality of Corfu, internationally established in 1864. He also informed the Italian forces that there were approximately seven thousand refugees from Asia Minor and Armenia, in the unfortified fortresses, whose children had been placed under the protection of the Mayor of London. Evripaios’ first telegram remained unanswered: “The Italian fleet has arrived in Corfu, requesting to surrender the town within half an hour. Not having been able to communicate with you until now, and not possessing the necessary forces, I had to take the initiative, although formally refusing the surrender, not to put up any resistance, with the agreement of the Commanding officer. Awaiting orders.” Metropolitan Bishop Athenagoras Spyrou suggested resistance, but the mayor Stylianos Maniarizis, the commander of the gendarmerie, the harbourmaster, and the commanding officer Major Panagopoulos, thought that this would be suicide.
When the deadline expired, the turrets of the Italian battleships turned their barrels towards the town firing cannon balls for 25 minutes. The first shell exploded in the heart of the New Fortress, where the Police Academy was located. The descriptions recorded describe the panic of the refugees. Shells hit the Old Fortress, the district of Tenedos, reaching as far as Sarocco square and the old Jewish cemetery. 15 dead and 35 wounded, almost all refugees from Asia Minor, were killed in the bombardment, most of whom were later thrown into a mass grave, along the Old Fortress.
The forensic report on the victims, prepared on 1 September 1923 by the director of the health inspection division of the Corfu Police Headquarters, N. Vasilas and the doctors S. Stinis and F. Politis, is shocking. It states, among other things: “(…) The body of a 65-year-old male, with fragments from shell explosion, three on the chest, two in the abdomen, and others on the right hand, from which his right thumb is severed. This body appears to belong to a hard-working refugee, and there are two points quite impressive. First, he is wearing spats of black colour, spotlessly clean, obviously new, he is not wearing shoes, and secondly, his pockets are turned inside out. It is highly possible that this man had shoes on, which were removed by those who transported him here, who searched his pockets and robbed the dead man”.
Prefect Evripaios attempted to send a second telegram: “All of a sudden and for no reason, although I notified the Italian Admiral that there will be no resistance, he commenced bombarding the town. Heavy fire from the entire fleet. The fortresses and the surrounding areas are being heavily hit. Battleships are participating with their heavy artillery”. In Athens, Gonatas and Plastiras’ lack of communication is monumental, as they could not probably realise the magnitude of the Italian retaliation. Plastiras was in favour of military intervention, but this would allow More moderate, Gonatas finally decidedMussolini to conquer the island, calling it a war conflict. to compromise and appeal to the international institutions, but his attempt to send a telegram with instructions to Corfu was unfruitful. At the telegraph office, Evripaios was waiting for the half-finished Government order in vain. “I order you to…” and at 16:27 he was obliged to raise the white flag in the Old Fortress.
As soon as Admiral Solari perceived the surrender of the town, he ordered to cease fire and immediately, hundreds of soldiers and officers in battledress, came in launches and poured out into the port, occupying places, organizing bridgeheads with portable firearms, while they took over the Fortress, raising the Italian flag on its top. Colonel Panagopoulos with his men had already taken refuge inland, awaiting orders, whereas only the thousand panicked refuges had remained in the fortress, crammed in the mines.
The gendarmerie headquarters, the recruiting office which was vandalised, the Police Academy, the Garrison, the Prefecture, the Hospital, all were occupied within two hours by the Italians, whereas Admiral Solari circulated a declaration, which informed about Tellini’s murder, the Greek Government’s refusal to accept the “fair (as he called them) terms” of the Italian Government, informing on the decision to occupy the island and insisting that their actions “were not war actions but peaceful”. In addition, he set out the terms of the occupation: By 4:00 p.m. the Greek flag will have been lowered and the Italian will have been raised, which will be saluted with 21 cannon fire. Rear Admiral Aurelio Belleni took over the commandment of the island. He was also handed over the barracks of the military forces and the gendarmerie, which were disarmed. All weapons of the troops and the ordnance warehouses were surrendered. The Greek soldiers after their disarmament, were gathered in a small barracks. The Greek officers and soldiers were forbidden to walk around. The barracks were prepared to accommodate the occupation troops. Telegraphic, telephone and postal communications were cut off. Italian control was imposed on land and sea transportation. Moreover, a detachment arrested Evripaios and led him to the Italian flagship. Captain Foschini charged him of being responsible for the incident, as because of his indecisiveness and his refusal to surrender the town, they were forced, despite the initial assurances, to attack. He also accused him that he was not clear on the existence of refugees inside the fortresses, declaring that it was not their intention to cause human casualties and especially civilian population. Then, they deported him and the Police Commander to Athens, which continued to remain a mere spectator to all this.
Despite the persistent appeals of the Greek Government to the Council of the League of Nations to take action, and its desire to appeal to the International Court of Justice in Hague to settle the incident with Italy, this approach of ‘friendly’ indecisiveness and coward compromises, obliged it on 8 September to swallow its pride and pay the compensation requested, and execute other terms imposed. It must be noted that the amount of 50 million liras, requested by Mussolini, was equivalent to 500,000 pounds and that Greece had just secured a loan of 750,000 pounds to temporarily meet the needs of the refugees, so the impact of this compensation to the state budget was grave.
Finally, and after the Italian government’s terms were met, it was ordered to evacuate the island and the new commander Vice admiral Diego Simonetti, commenced preparations for the smooth transition to the previous authorities. At 8:00 am, on the morning of 27 September, the Italian flag was lowered from the mast of the old fortress and the Greek flag was raised amidst cannon fire and cheers. The same happened in the buildings of the Prefecture, the Municipality and Mon Repos, while the Italian fleet was leaving Corfu. The people reacted jubilantly and both Evripaios, who had already returned, and the consuls of France and Great Britain received a grand welcome.
The crime in Kakavia was never solved, despite the various scenarios circulated from time to time. Either crime or provocation, the Corfu incident, apart from the political storm it created, it sustained for many years the Greek-Italian territorial rivalry, but it also revealed the weakness of the leadership of this country to resolve such a crisis reliably and successfully. It also proved the weakness of the international institutions and organisations to serve justice, as it led to the unnecessary sacrifice of the refugees, who were crammed in a corner of the fortress, and out of curiosity at the sight of the Italian fleet, they climbed the walls to see the armada moor off the harbour.
The bodies of the victims were transferred, at some point, from some unknown corner of the Old Fortress to some other unknown corner of the municipal cemetery. Today, a memorial plaque has been placed on the left of the entrance, on the wall to remind the visitors of their uncalled-for death.
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